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IVIIKE SABELLA, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. SOUTHERN
PACIFIC CO]VIP ANY, Defendant and Appellant.
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[la, Ib]Damages-Excessive-Remittitur as Condition to Denying
New Trial-Personal Injury Action.-In an action under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, the court properly denied
defendant's motion for new trial on the ground of excessive
damages on condition that plaintiff consent to a remittitur,
where the court recognized that it had erroneously precluded
an attempt by defendant to counter the effect of a certain medical report, introduced by plaintiff, by showing that the report
had been written in the context of plaintiff's application for a
disability pension, and where all the evidence, including the
evidence improperly excluded, was sufficient to support liability
but not to the extent awarded by the verdict.
[2] Id.-Excessive Damages-Remittitur.-A prejudicial error in
law in the form of an exclusion of relevant evidence at a trial
does not necessarily require a complete new trial as opposed
to a remittitur. If the error relates only to the measure of
damages and if the appropriate amount can be ascertained
from the evidence, remittitur is the proper remedy.
[3] Id.-Excessive Damages-Remittitur as Condition to Denying
New Trial-Personal Injury Action.-On appeal after an action
by an injured employee under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act in which the court denied defendant's motion for new
trial based on excessive damages, on condition that plaintiff
consent to a remittitur, defendant could not successfully urge
that the remittitur was precluded by the probability that the
jury's passion and prejudice, caused by misconduct of plain- -tiff's attorney, would have been reduced by certain other evidence proffered by defendant but improperly excluded by the
court, where defendant, at trial, had failed to counter the
prejudice arising from the misconduct by timely objection and
request to admonish the jury.
[4a-4c] Trial-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-Objection and
Waiver.-In a personal injury action under the Federal Em[1] Excessiveness of damages in action for personal injuries not
resulting in death, note, 16 A.L.R.2d 3. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Damages, § 224; Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 366.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Damages, § 112; New Trial, § 243;
[2] Damages, § 110; [3] Damages, § 112; Trial, §§ 39, 40; [4]
Trial, § 39; Appeal and Error, § 1536-3; [5, 11] Appeal and Error,
§1536; [6J Appeal and Error, §195; [7,9, 10J Trial, §40; [8]
Trial, § 33 (4).
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ployers' Liability Act, misconduct by plaintiff's counsel in
repeatedly characterizing defendant railroad company as "in_
human," and as "cheapskates" attempting to put up a "smoke
screen" by perjury, and in referring to defendant sending
plaintiff "down the tubes" and casting him on the human "trash
pile," did not justify reversal of the judgment for plaintiff,
where the trial court impliedly found the misconduct nonprejudicial, and where defendant did not once request an
admonition to the jury and objected to only one line of argument, and then only after plaintiff had followed the same line
unchallenged throughout the trial until his concluding argument and after defendant had tried but failed to counter by
improper allusions to evidence already excluded by the court.
Appeal and Error-Determination and Disposition-Argument
and Conduct of Counsel.-A trial judge is in a better position
than an appellate court to determine whether a verdict resulted wholly, or in part, from the asserted misconduct of
counsel, and his conclusion in the matter will not be disturbed
unless, under all the circumstances, it is plainly wrong.
Id.-Necessity for Objection-Conduct of Counsel.-A claim
of counsel's misconduct, the effect of which would have been
removed by an admonition to the jury, is generally entitled
to no consideration on appeal unless the record shows a timely
and proper objection and a request that the jury be admonished.
Trial-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-Cure of Misconduct.-A trial court, in all but extreme cases, can correct improper acts of counsel, and remove any effect his conduct or
remarks would otherwise have, by acting promptly, speaking
clearly and directly on the subject, and instructing the jury
to disregard them.
Id.-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-What Constitutes
Misconduct.-In personal injury cases, it constitutes improper
tactics for plaintiff's counsel to accuse witnessesofperjury,--to make reference to defendant's wealth and plaintiff's lack
of resources, and to appeal, even indirectly, to the jurors to
place themselves in plaintiff's position.

[9] Id.-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-Cure of Misconduct.
-One of the primary purposes of admonishing a jury to disregard improper argument by counsel as soon as it starts is to .
avoid repetition of the remarks and thus obviate the necessity
of a new trial.

(10) Id.-Argument and Conduct of Counsel-Cure of Misconduct.
-Except perhaps in cases of highly emotional or inflammatory
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 81 ; Am.Jur., Trial (1st ed § 506).
.J
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language or reference to extremely prejudicial circumstances
not in evidence, a jury must be deemed capable, if so instructed, of ignoring references to a litigant's personal or
corporate qualities and of confining itself to the merits of the
case.
[11] Appeal and Error-Determination and Disposition-Argument and Conduct of Counsel.-In determining whether misconduct of counsel in a trial merits reversal of the judgment,
each case must ultimately rest upon the court's view of the
over-all record, taking into account such factors as the nature
and seriousness of the remarks and misconduct, the general
atmosphere (including the judge's control) of the trial, the
likelihood of prejudicing the jury, and the efficacy of objection
or admonition under all the circumstances.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Clayton W. Horn, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
by a carman cutter for injuries sustained in the course of his
employment. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.

._)

Louis L. Phelps, Richard H. Bailin, Dunne, Phelps & Mills
and Arthur B. Dunne for Defendant and Appellant.
Boccardo, Blum, Lull, Niland, Teerlink & Bell, Edward J.
Niland and Stanley A. Ibler, Jr., for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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MOSK, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment in favor of
plaintiff under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
jury brought in a verdict of $115,500, but by remittitur to
-which plaintiff consented the award was reduced to $80,000.
Defendant cites as error the trial court's refusal to admit
evidence of a disability pension, and purported misconduct by
plaintiff's counsel. We conclude that the judgment must be
affirmed.
Plaintiff Mike Sabella was injured while working as a ".carman cutter" for defendant railroad. Among other duties, it
was his task to cut damaged freight cars into scrap. While
doing so, plaintiff fell from the roof of a car he was cutting
and sustained severe back injuries. He alleged that his fall
was caused by the negligence of defendant's crane operator in
moving the roof section, which had been attached to the crane
preparatory to lifting the section off, while plaintiff was still
walking on it; and by the failure of defendant to provide a
reasonably safe place in which to work. The defense was based
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on a denial of negligence and an allegation of contributory
negligence, which may reduce an F.E.L.A. award.
At the conclusion of the trial, and following the verdict in
favor of plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial on multiple grounds: (1) insufficiency of the evidence; (2) excessive
damages; (3) disregard by the jury of the court's instructions as to contributory negligence; (4) error in law in
excluding evidence of a disability pension received by plaintiff; and (5) misconduct by plaintiff's counsel. The· court
made an order finding "That the evidence is insufficient to
sustain the verdict of the jury; and [that there] was error in
law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by defendant, and
that such error was prejudicial. . . ."1 A new trial was
denied, however, on the condition that plaintiff consent to a
reduction of the verdict from $115,500 to $80,000. Plaintiff
agreed and does not now challenge the propriety of the reduction.
The parties are in accord that the only "error in law"
asserted by the defendant, and that undoubtedly referred to
by the court, was the· exclusion of evidence of plaintiff's disability pension. Arguments as to the propriety of the remittitur in this case cannot, therefore, be premised on an assumption that the trial court also found prejudicial misconduct by
'plaintiff's attorney. By necessary implication, the allegation
of misconduct was rejected by the trial court, and the remittitur was intended solely to rectify the exclusion of the evidence of the pension. We turn, then, to an examination of this
alleged error in law and the effect of a remittitur on such
error.
During the course of the trial, counsel for plaintiff pro... ~.-posedto-1"eadquestions .and .answers . concerning plaintiff's _~.~.~.;. .. ,--:...
condition from a form which had been filled in by Dr. Calvin
.
of the . Southern Pacific Hospital. The questions read were as
follows: "May applicant's condition be expected toimprove?" followed by a check mark against "No";" Applicant able to work in last occupation?" followed by checks.
against "At present-No"; "May applicant be able to work
in last occupation in the future?" followed by a check
against "No"; "Type of work: Limitation to 25 pounds
weight lifting, and no climbing or working on moving railroad equipment. "
1This case was tried prior to the passage of Code of Civil Procedure
section 657, which now requires a judge to specify his reasons for granting a whole or partial new trial. (See Met'cer v. Perez (1968) 68 Cal.2d
104 [65 Cal.Rptr. 315, 436 P.2d 315].

Feb. 1969]

)

.,

,

SABELLA V. SOUTHERN PAC.

CO.

315

[70 C.2d 311; 74 Ca1.Rptr. 534, 449 P.2d '150]

Defendant sought to read into evidence other parts of this
form and an accompanying letter, which would have revealed
tha.t the subject of the form was plaintiff's application to the
Railroad Retirement Board for a disability pension. The purpose of such evidence, asserted defendant, would be (1) to
show that the report was really based on a subjective evaluation, influenced by the opinion of the doctor that since plaintiff was applying for a disability pension, he probably could
not be expected to improve because he did not want or have to
go back to work; (2) to explain and identify the whole of the
document of which plaintiff read only a part (citing Code
Civ. Proc. § 1854, now Evid. Code, § 356) ; and ,(3) to counter
allegations that defendant had refused plaintiff a job and had
generally turned its back on him following his injury.
Plaintiff objected on the ground that Eichel v. New York
Central R.R. Co. (1963) 375 U.S. 253 [11 L.Ed.2d 307, 84
S.Ot. 316], makes such evidence inadmissible. In Eichel, also
an F .E.L.A. case, evidence was offered of receipt by the petitioner of a Railroad Retirement Act pension, in order to
impeach his testimony as to motive for not returning to work
and as to the permanence of his injury. The court held that
"it would violate the spirit of the federal statutes" to admit
evidence of such a pension. It reasoned that Railroad Retirement- Act benefits may not be considered in mitigation of
damages, and there 'will generally be other evidence of
malingering with greater probative value and less likelihood
of misuse by the jury. This balance of probative value against
prejudicial effect is also the law of this state, now embodied in
Evidence Code section 352.
.,[ia] Defendant distinguishes Eichel on the ground that
here plaintiff had "opened the door " to-such -evidence by.
himself introducing a portion of the form in question.
Defendant analogizes to the cases admitting evidence of insurance coverage where the opposing party has broached the
subject or made such evidence necessary to explain or refute
counterevidence (see, e.g., Hatfield v. Levy Bros. (1941) 18
Ca1.2d '798 [117 P .2d 841] ), and further contends that Eichel
has been interpreted in such a manner (Gladden 'v. P. Henderson & Co. (3d Cir. 1967) 385 F.2d 480, cert.den. 390 U.S.
1013 [20 L.Ed.2d 162, 88 S.Ct. 1262]).
We find it unnecessary to resolve this close question of
prejudice and probative value. Upon motion for a new trial,
the court obviously decided it should have admitted the evidence in question and proceeded to order the remittitur. J 11

,
"
"
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short, the court deemed that all the evidence, including that
which it rejected but later determined should have been
admitted, was insufficient to support the amount of the award.
This in no way suggests that the court considered the evidence insufficient to support any award. (Muench v. Gerske
(1934) 139 Cal.App. 438, 443-444 [34 P.2d 198].) Under the
circumstances, the remittitur was proper.
[2] Defendant, however, insists that only insufficiency of
the evidence can justify a remittitur, and that a prejudicial
error in law due to exclusion of relevant evidence, having
. deprived defendant of a full hearing by the jury on all the
evidence, necessarily requires a complete new trial. No
authority compels such rule and we find the contention
untenable. For example, it has never been held that. if evidence of certain medical expenses, relating only to the issue of
damages, were wrongfully excluded the court would be forced
to order a new trial on all issues. Patently this is impractical
and contrary to the purposes of the remittitur procedure. If,
as the trial court impliedly found here, the only defect relates
to the measure of damages, and if the appropriate amount can
be ascertained from the evidence, remittitur is the proper
remedy to c~re that defect and avoid the necessity of a new
trial.2
[lb] The record supports the conclusion that the error in
law here alleged was limited in effect to the question of dam:ages.. The issue of liability in this case concerned only the.
manner in which plaintiff cut the freight car, the actions of
the crane operator, and the safety of the working conditions
provided by defendant. Clearly the question whether plaintiff
in fact had a permanent injury or was simply malingering,
~ ~ ~-~------~.. ---.~theaccuracy and .mannerof the doctors' diagnoses, _andthe_~~_~. . . 'i_:;
availability of future work for plaintiff relate to none of t h e "
above factors of liability, but only to the assessment of
....... .
damages. There is no allegation that the damages as now.
reduced are excessive. Consequently both the application and
the result of the remittitur in this case were proper, and any
error in law that might have occurred was thereby cured.
[3] But, defendant asserts, the excluded evidence might
2For purposes of this case we may assume that, as defendant contends,
excessive damages resulting from passion or prejudice which might also
affect the issue of liability cannot be cured by a remittitur. (See Minneapolis, St. Paul etc. By. Co. v. Moquin (1931) 283 U.S. 520 [75 L.Ed. 1243,
51 S.Ot. 501]; but cf. Deevy v. Tassi (1942) 21 Oa1.2d 109, 120-121 [130
P.2d 389].) However, the court's remittitur does not imply a finding of
passion or prejudice. (Hughes v. Hearst Publications, Ino. (1947) 79
Cal.App.2d 703, 705 [180 P.2d 419].)
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also have helped to counter plaintiff's charges-which
defendant assigns as misconduct-that defendant unfairly
turned its back on him after the accident, and might thus
have reduced any passion or prejudice inherent therein.
Assuming arguendo that the statements in question were both
improper and prejudicial, a matter to be discussed below, the
remedy was not the insertion of additional prejudicial evidence, attempting in effect to counter error with error. The
antidote was a timely objection and request for admonition of
the jury, to remove the effect of the wrongful statements.
Even more clearly than in Eichel, defendant had this less
prejudicial means of making its point; as will be seen, it
failed to utilize this means and cannot now complain of an
inability to mitigate any prejudice that resulted. s
[ 4a] We turn now to defendant's second major contention, i.e., that plaintiff's counsel was guilty of prejudicial
misconduct. The alleged misconduct consisted, among other
things, of repeated references, both direct and indirect, to
defendant as "inhuman" and heartless, sending plaintiff
"down the tubes" and casting him on the "human trash
pile"; as "cheapskates" attempting to put up a "smokescreen" by perjury and deceit, so as to deprive plaintiff of his
just due and put the money instead into defendant's
, 'coffers. " Reference was also made to the disparity in wealth
between plaintiff and defendant, combined with an appeal to
the jurors' personal sympathies. 4 It is unnecessary to detail
any further the precise language used or to make a phrase-byphrase comparison between this and other exemplars of mis3Despite the court's exclusion of all evidence of the pension, on those
occasions when defendant did object to plaintiff's charges of unfairness
defendant attempted to inject this evideneebyindirect reference. When
plaintiff's counsel made statements referring to defendant's ill treatment
of plaintiff, defendant objected and each time alluded to "the offer of
proof I made in chambers as to what this man's actual situation was and
the election he made," or to (( what was done for this man," or employed
similar statements. This was improper ,especially when used in lieu of a
request for an admonition of the jury. (See Boyd v. Theetgee (1947) 78
Cal.App.2d 346 [177 P.2d 637].) But even if defendant's misconduct
could somehow cancel out that of his adversary, plaintiff, like his
opponent, failed to object to the remarks in order to preserve the issue
for appeal.
4In recent years a number of personal injury lawyers have written
books suggesting a variety of somewhat deceptive means of eliciting
sympathy for litigants appearing before a jury. (See Prosser, 43 Cal.
L.Rev. 556 (1955), reviewing Belli, Modern Trials (1954); R. M. Mosk,
16 D.C.L.A. L.Rev. 216 (1968), reviewing Appleman, Preparation and
Trial (1967).) Such tactics are not part of the repertoire of the ethical
'Professional man.
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conduct since it is only the record as a whole, and not specific
phrases out of context, that can reveal the nature and effect of
such tactics. Upon review of the entire record we conclude
that plaintiff's counsel was guilty of deplorable misconduct
which might well have been prejudicial. [5] [See fn. 5]
However, in view of defendant's failure to take proper steps
to preserve the latter issue of prejudice on appeal, we find it
unnecessary to reach it on the merits. 5
Assuming counsel's conduct was both improper and prejudicial, and further assuming for purposes of discussion that
such misconduct went to the issue of liability and so could not
be cured by remittitur (see fn. 2, ante), we examine the
record before us in light of the applicable legal principles.
[6] "Generally a claim of misconduct is entitled to no
c~nsideration on appeal unless the record shows a timely and
proper objection and a request that the jury be admonished."
(Horn v. Atchison, T. &- B.F. Ry. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602,
610 [39 Cal.Rptr. 721, 394 P.2d 561].) '" As the effect of
misconduct can ordinarily be removed by an instruction to the
jury to disregard it, it is generally ·essential, in order that
such act be reviewed on appeal, that it shall first be called to
the attention of the trial court at the time, to give the court
an opportunity to so act ill the premises, if possible, as to
correct the error and avoid a mistrial. Where the a.ction of the
court is not thus invoked, the alleged misconduct will not be
considered on appeal, if an admonition to the jury would have
. removed the effect."~ (Cope v. Davison (1947) supra, 30
Ca1.2d at p. 202.) [7] '" It is only in extreme· cases that
the court, when acting promptly and speaking clearly and
directly on the subject, cannot, by instructing the jury to
-~-. ··-~-disregard such matters, correct the· impropriety of the- act6f--·~~'"
·counsel and remove any effect his conduct or remarks would
otherwise have.' (Tingley v. Times-Mirror Co., 151 Cal. 1, 23
[89 P. 1097].) . . . [W] e are aware of no California case
wherein a plaintiff's verdict was reversed for misconduct.
during his counsel's argument in the lack of timely objections
.and a request that the jury be admonished where such
admonition could be effective." (Horn v. Atchison, T. &- B.F.
Ry. Co. (1964) supra, 61 Ca1.2d at pp. 610-611.)
5In any event, the trial court impliedly found no misconduct, or at least
no prejudice, when ruling on the motion for new trial. "A trial judge is
in a better position than an appellate court to determine whether a verdict
resulted wholly, or ill part, from the asserted misconduct of counsel and
his conclusion in the matter will not be disturbed unless, under all the
circumstances, it is plainly wrong." (Oope v. Davison (1947) 30 Ca1.2d
193,203 [180 P.2d 873, 171 A.L.R. 667].)
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[4b] This case is neither precisely like Horn, supra, in
which no objection or request for admonition was made until
after conclusion of the closing argument (and relief was thus
denied) ; nor like Hoffrnan v. Brandt (1966) 65 Ca1.2d 549
[55 Cal.Rptr. 417, 421 P.2d 425], in which an admonition,
especially as there given by the trial court, could not have
been effective under the circumstances; nor like Love v. W ol!
(1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378 [38 Cal.Rptr. 183], in which
admonition of the jury was requested several times but disregarded by the trial court. Here defendant remained silent as
to all but one line of argument, and as to the latter he
objected but failed at any time to request an admonition of
the jury to disregard the remarks. Under the circumstances
we conclude that defendant must be denied relief. (See Estate
of Hart (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 60,70 [236 P.2d 884].)
[8] The record indicates that while plaintiff's counsel
accused witnesses of perjury, made reference to defendant's
wealth and plaintiff's lack of resources, and appealed, though
indirectly, to the jurors to place themselves in plaintiff's position, all of which tactics are improper and to be condemned
(see, e.g., Hoffman v. Brandt (1966) supra, 65 Ca1.2d 549;
Horn v. Atchison, T. & S.P. Ry. Co. (1964) supra" 61 Ca1.2d
602; Love v. lVol! (1964) supra, 226 Cal.App.2d 378),
defendant did not once object to such remarks, much less
request an admonition to the jury. "In the absence of a
timely objection the offended party is deemed to have waived
the claim of error through his participation in the atmosphere
which produced the claim of prejudice." (Horn v. Atchison,
T. & S.P. Ry. Co. (1964) supra, 61 Ca1.2d at p. 610.)
[4c] Defendant did object, however, to one distinct line of
~ argument by his adversary. Asdiscusseu earlier,defendant
challenged references to turning its back on plaintiff and
refusing to help him or to give him a job and generally being
out to defeat his claim. This was, .in fact, perhaps the mildest
and least prejudicial of the alleg'ed instances of misconduct.
Although counsel used improper language, the question of
defendant's treatment of plaintiff appears to have been put in
issue, at least in part, by defendant when it asserted during
opening statement that there was work plaintiff could do on
the railroad. However, even assuming that the entire line of
argument was misconduct, defendant remained silent when
during opening argument plaintiff's counsel at least twice
alluded to defendant's denial of a job and of hospitalization
to plaintiff, and when during the trial he used such terms as

320
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"cheapskates" in referring to defendant. It was not until
closing argument, after defendant had attempted to counter
the" unfairness" argument with evidence of plaintiff's disability pension (see fn. 3 supra), rather than by means of the
long established procedure of admonishing the jury,6 that
defendant finally objected, but even at that tardy point
counsel did not request an admonition. Certainly as to this
particular line of argument an admonition would have been
effective, especially if requested at the outset. [9] One of
the primary purposes of admonition at the beginning of an
improper course of argument is to avoid repetition of the
remarks and thus obviate the necessity of a new trial. (Horn
v. Atch1'son, T. &- S.F. Ry. Co. (1964) supra, 61 Cal.2d at p.
610.) [10] Except perhaps in cases of highly emotional or
inflammatory language or reference to extremely prejudicial
circumstances not in evidence, a jury must be deemed capable,
if so instructed, of ignoring references to a litigant's personal
or corporate virtues and confining itself to the merits of the
case. (Compare Deevy v. Tassi (1942) supra, 21 Cal.2d 109,
123, with People v. Kirkes (1952) 39 Ca1.2d 719, 726 [249
P.2d 1] .)7
Defendant urges us to ignore the rules of procedure relating to the "magic words" of proper' objection and admonition. But the procedure outlined above is not a meaningless
ritual; it has been designed through judicial experience to
prevent by timely words of caution the very problem with
which we are here concerned.
We emphasize again that the particular language used by
counsel and the form or lack of objection by defendant in this
case are not meant to serve as invariable guidelines for future reference. [11] Each case must ultimately rest upon a6Defendant asserts that it did not know at the outset how heavily this
line of argument would be emphasized, although during one objection
defendant claimed that it had been "anticipating" such an argument
and meant to counter it by evidence of the disability pension. Obviously,
the fact that this counterevidence was subsequently excluded cannot alone
excuse the failure to object if in fact the argument was improper. It was
not the exclusion of the pension evidence that determined the propriety
of the language and allusions employed by plaintiff'8 counsel.
7Defendant was apparently not unaware of the tactical availability and
desirability of an admonition to the jury. When plaintiff attempted to
argue damages on a "per diem" basis, defendant objected strenuously
and asked for and received an admonition that the jury disregard this
line of argument. (As to the propriety of that ruling, see Beagle v.
Vasold (1966) 65 Cal.2d 166 [53 Cal.Rptr. 129, 417 P.2d 673].) It is
significant that far more questionable statements made at the same time,
which defendant now cites as misconduct, were not alluded to in the
"per diem" objection.

I
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court's view of the overall record, taking into account such
factors, inter alia, as the nature and seriousness of the
remarks and misconduct, the general atmosphere, including
the judge's control,S of the trial, the likelihood of prejudicing
the jury, and the efficacy of objection or admonition under all
the circumstances.
Our conclusions should in no way be interpreted as condoning the deplorable conduct of plaintiff's counse1. 9 IIowever,
punishment of counsel to the detriment of his client is not the
function of the court. (See Shaff v. Baldwin (1951) 107 Cal.
App.2d 81, 87 [236 P.2d 634].) Intemperate and unprofessional conduct by counsel as is here involved runs a grave and
unjustifiable risk of sacrificing an otherwise sound case for
recovery, and as such is a disservice to a litigant. These same
tactics, in another context, would likely result in a reversal.
However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we
conclude that the award to plaintiff, as modified by the remittitur, is justified.
The judgment is affirmed.

~

)

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Burke, J., and Sulli.
van, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-I dissent.
I would reverse the judgment on the ground that the misconduct of counsel for plaintiff deprived defendant of its
right to a fair trial.
In his opening statement, counsel for plaintiff made a preliminary appeal to the sympathy of the jury by stressing that
_plaintiff had left school after the sevel,lth grade to go to work
and had worked for defendant forB6 years~ Thereafter in the·
course of the trial, counsel deliberately sought to implant
prejudice in the jury against defendant. He insinuated
without offering any evidence to prove it, that defense counsel
had withheld photographs favorable to plaintiff. He referred

;
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SWhile it cannot be said that the trial court here "lost control" of
the proceedings (cf. Love v. Wolf (1964) supra, 226 Cal.App.2d 378,
391), a court should on its own initiative intercede to prevent potentially
prejudicial conduct of counsel. Such action here, directed either at counsel or to the jury, not only might have mitigated the prejudice here
alleged, but it would have enhanced the dignity and demeanor of the
proceedings.
9Counsel's law firm has been the subject of judicial condemnation in
at least two other recent instances of comparable misconduct. (Horn v.
Atchison, T. 9- S.F. By. Co., supra, 61 Ca1.2d 602; Love v. Wolf, supra,
226 Cal.App.2d 378.)
'10 C.2d-U
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to defendant and its attorneys as "cheapskates." He asked
rhetorical questions calculated to convey the impression that
defense witnesses were 110t honest in their testimony. Nor was
that all. After several days of trial, when a trial court is
normally reluctant to grant a mistrial, he used his closing
argument to intensify his appeal to the passion and prejudice
of the jury. The appeal was the more insidious because it
followed upon a fulsome declaration of his great trust in the
jury system. His trust was such that he urged a verdict on
issues extraneous to the merits . .Approximately a third of his
argument consisted of emotional attacks on defendant, its
counsel, and its witnesses for defendant. He called upon the
jury to "tell the Southern Pa.cific in that verdict it is high
time to quit treating their employees that way."
There is no question that his conduct was on its face prejudicial. The question to be resolved is whether or not defendant
waived its right t{) complain even though it repeatedly made
objections at the tria!.! The objections were more than enough
to alert the trial court. The court itself sought to call a halt to
the objectionable conduct by admonishing counsel for plaintiff
to "confine yourself to the evidence and .such reasonable
lCounsel for defendant objected ten times during the closing argument
for plaintiff. The appeals to prejudice and the corresponding objections
are tallied below:
.
First: "Now, ladies and gentlemen, I know that before you folks sat
here, that you eame here on January 25th, 1964, and I know in your
hearts, as in my heart, after you saw the presentation of this ease, that
l: '11 bet you are amazed and stunned beyond belief. This isn't really 1964
at all. This goes back to the early stages of man's inhumanity to man
long before they were savages, because I submit, and I will discuss with
you folks this afternoon, never in the history of man could anyone have
been taken down the tubes or down the drain like one Mike Sabella was.
e, And I say to you, ladies and gentlemen, that the conduct of his
employer, the Southern Pacific Company in this case, is about as repre.hensible in 1956 [sic]"MR. PHELPS [counsel for defendant]: Your Honor, I am going to
object to this line of argument and assign it as misconduct, particularly
in view of Your Honor's ruling that is keeping out of evidence the
matter that I wanted to introduce, the matter that 1-.the argument is
along the lines I was anticipating and I could have met and did want
to meet by evidence, and I will object and cite it as misconduct and ask
for a mistrial.
, 'THE COURT: Well, the motion for a mistrial will be denied; and I
suggest, Mr. Teerlink, that you confine yourself to the evidence and such
reasonable implications as you may draw therefrom.
"MR. TEERLINK: Yes, Your Honor."
.
Second: "Did they even agree to pick up $11.50 a month to see that
the poor guy got his hospitalization' No.
H MR PHELPS: If Your Honor please, I am going to 0 bj ect in view of
the offer of proof I made in chambers as to what this man's actual
situation was and the election he made, and I think it is misconduct to
encroach in the manner that has been done.
"MR. TEERLINK: The stipulation, as I understand, Your Honor, was
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implications as you may draw therefrom." When counsel for
plaintiff nevertheless made fresh appeals to the passion and
prejudice of the jury, and defense counsel continued to
that the railroad company tendered the right to pick up his hospital
benefits, and they declined; that was the stipulation that you entered.
"MR. PHELPS:I understand that, but you are arguing something that
prevents me from answering.
, 'THE COURT: Let's not go beyond the stipulation."
Third: "They cut off-no more hospital benefits, no more out-patient,
by the time of December"MR. PHELPS: I make the same objection, Your Honor please, in view
of the situation, my hands having been tied"MR. TEERLINK: I say there are no benefits payable after December.
That is the evidence.
I I MR. PHELPS: I What did the Southern Pacific Company do when
you'I I THE COURT: Let's"MR. PHELPS: - I object to that and assign it as misconduct.
"MR. TEERLINK: That is the evidence, Your Honor. He had no benefits after December.
, I THE COURT: I know, but you are going beyond that.
I I MR. PHELPS: You foreclosed me.
I'THE COURT: Let's stay within the confines."
Fourth: "Do you think that was strategy~ This is the way they play
the ball game. They don't know how to play it fair. The last witness,
ladies and gentlemen, is, 10 and behold, McLaughlin'I MR. PHELPS: I object and assign that as misconduct: 'They don 't
know how to play it fair.' There is a case that t4is very firm .has been
reversed for, argument of a similar nature, and I assign it as misconduct
and ask for a mistrial.
I I THE COURT: Motion denied."
Fifth: I' They employ 45,000 people, and they couldn't make room for
him to do anything-maybe even delivering the messages down at 65
Market Street; you mean to tell me, ladies and gentlemen, if you have
got the good will of your employee at stake that you won't at least call
him up and say'I MR. PHELPS: I am going to object to this on the same ground and
cite it as misconduct. Your Honor knows what the situation is. Your
Honor knows what I was foreclosed from, and I think that this is
improper argument.
I I THE COURT : Just a moment.
t I MR. PHELPS: Your Honor knows what the situation was.
t I THE COURT: Let's keep it within the confines of the evidence."
Sixth: ' 'Now, ladies and gentlemen, isn't· it· interesting to you, when
they've got all these pictures, where is that claims man with the rest· of
the pictures they didn 't show~ He has been around here for two weeks,
and we haven't seen or heard from him.
.
"MR. PHELPS: Just a moment. He is implying- You told me you
didn't want him this morning.
, 'MR. TEERLINK: Only"MR. PHELPS: You told me you didn't want him. I had him here at
your request.
I I MR. TEERLINK: Sit down and let me finish my argument.
I I THE COURT: All right, gentlemen; we have a time limit. Please."
Seventh: 'I Does it seem ironical to you, ladies and gentlemen, that
they can take aerial photographsI 'MR. PHELPS: I I I MR. TEERLINK: Will you keep out of my argument. -that they can
take aerial photographs within a few hours or less than that' Imagine
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object, the court once again admonished counsel for plaintiff
to "stay within the confines." When counsel for plaintiff
persisted in his misconduct, in the fa.ce not only of defendant's objections and motions for mistrial but also of the
admonitions of the court, he evinced a studied determination
to ride roughshod over any and all objections or admonitions.
Though he threw one caution after another to the wind, he
now contends that defendant waived objection to any miscon. duct by not supplementing his repeated objections with a
request that the trial court admonish the jury to disregard the
misconduct. 2 No admonition, however, could cure the prejugetting an airplane and camera equipment and start shooting photographs
to defeat a claim-and rulers, when all they would have had to do-"
(The photographs were not taken from an airplane.)
Eighth: ' 'Mike Sabella was lying on his back with a busted back
thinking maybe they were going to do something decent for him, maybe
once in a life the friendly Southern Pacific could be friendly. No, sir.
All we get is a second best, a lousy evidence that they decide to bring in.
, 'You see, all the pictures that may show it to his advantage, you
don't see them.
"MR. PHELPS: N ow, 'MR. TEERLINK: They are not here.
"MR. PHELPS: I will object to that and assign it as misconduct. This
is, again, characteristic of the defense, and without any evidence, without
justification, and the type of thing that the Courts have said is not
proper, and I object to it.
, 'THE CoURT: Go ahead."
Ninth: "Now, what about poor Mr. Medina [a witness for defendant]' What do you think poor Mr. Medina must think when he sees and
he knows what they are doing to Mike' What would happen to poor
Medina if he didn't go along with it' Ever think about that'
, 'When they see how they threw him on the human trash pile, how
quick would they give it to Medina if he didn't go along"MR. PHELPS: I object again and cite this as misconduct in view of
the fact I was foreclosed from proving that isn't the fact as to what we
did or what was done for this man, and I cannot stand still and listen
to this, knowing what the facts are."
Tenth: "[Y]ou can look at the sorrowful look in a man's eyes when
you are taking his deposition, and they cry out to you, 'I would like to
help you, Mr. Teerlink, but I can't; I've got to send him down the
tubes; it is him or me,' and that is the way you see it.
"MR. PHELPS: If Your Honor please, 'down the tubes,' when this
man is down-the situation is such, Your Honor please, I am foreclos~d
from saying it"MR. TEERLINK: You've said that about 14 times.
, 'MR. PHELPS: The ruling"MR. TEERLINK: You haven't given him a job; that is for sure.
l ( MR. PHELPS:
That is just- Now, there we go again.
"If Your Honor please, instruct Mr. Teerlink to desist from that.
I assign it again as misconduct and move for a mistrial in view of the
offers that I made of proof.
, 'THE COURT: Denied. Proceed."
2It is at least debatable that implicit in any objection to misconduct
is a request that the jury be admonished to disregard it. Thus, in Hoffman v. Brandt (1966) 65 Ca1.2d 549, 553 [55 Cal.Rptr. 417, 421 P.2d
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dicial effect of such misconduct as prevailed throughout this
case. Accordingly, defendant's failure to request admonitions
to the jury does not preclude it from challenging the misconduct on appeal. (Hoffman v. B1'andt (1966) 65 Ca1.2d 549,
553 [55 Cal.Rptr. 417, 421 P.2d 425] ; Horn v. Atchison, T. &7
S. F. R.R. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602, 611 [39 Cal.Rptr. 721,
394 P.2d 561] ; Love v. Woll (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 392
[38 Cal.Rptr. 183].) Plaintiff's counsel can hardly claim that
his repeated appeals to passion and prejudice were of such
little appeal that they could have been simply erased by
admonitions.
Counsel for plaintiff offers a brace of alternative contentions, namely, that there was no misconduct but only colorful
argument, and that in the event of any error, it was cured by
the trial court's remittitur. These contentions cannot be sustained. It is misconduct to compare the wealth of plaintiff and
defendant (Hoffman v. Brandt, s'upra, 65 Ca1.2d 549, 553;
Love v. W oll, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 388-389) ; counsel
for plaintiff did SO.3 It is misconduct to accuse defendant and
defendant's counsel of suborning perjury (Love v. Wolf.
supra, 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 391) ; counsel for plaintiff did SO.4
It is misconduct to accuse defense counsel of withholding evidence (Keena v. United Railroads (1925) 197 Cal. 148, 158160 [239 P. 1061]) ; counsel for plaintiff did SO.5 It is miscon.:
duct to suggest to the jurors that they measure damages by
what they would take to endure plaintiff's suffering (Horn v.
Atchison, T. &7. S. F. R.R. Co., supra, 61 Cal.2d 602, 609;
Zibbell v. Southern Pac. Co. (1911) 160 Cal. 237, 255 [116 P.
513]) ; counsel for plaintiff did SO.6 It is misconduct to suggest facts not in evidence that counsel knows could be contradicted by evidence that the court had excluded (Hoffman v.
425], counsel objected but did not request an admonition. The trial court,
however, admonished the jury on its own motion. We nevertheless held
toat the admonition did not cure the error.
8Referring to plaintiff, counsel said: "You saw what they did to him.
You saw the thanks he got. He got just exactly what they give to any
poor guy with a seventh grade education: he got nothing."
About defendant, he said: ' 'They employ 45,000 people, and they
wouldn't even make room for him to do anything-maybe even delivering
the messages down at 65 Market Street."
4See note 1, supra, Ninth.
C>See note 1, supra, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth.
6" And as to that 6,570 days of misery he has got left, there isn't a
soul in this world that would put up with what Mike Sabella is going to
have to put up with, the hopelessness of it all, for a measly figure we have
got down there."
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Brandt, sup"a, 65 Ca1.2d 549, 554) ; counsel for plaintiff did
SO.7

)

The courtroom is a forum for the presentation of evidence
and rational argument, not a stage for over mellow drama.
The responsibility of a lawyer is to raise issues, not scenes,
and to reason about them in nontheatrical terms. Invective,
with all its theatrics, has no place in the language of the
law.
When appeals to passion and prejudice may have influenced
a verdict, they may have influenced it on the issue of liability
as well as on the issue of damages. Hence, in such a case
remittitur cannot cure the error. (Minneapolis, etc. RR. 00. v.
Moquin (1931) 283 U.S. 520 [75 L.Ed. 1243, 51 S.Ct. 501] ;
Sanguinetti v.MooreDry Dock 00. (1951) 36 Ca1.2d 812, 820
[228 P.2d 557].) There is no cure but reversal for an error
that impairs the right to a fair trial. The right to a fair trial
includes the right to an impartial trier of fact and the correlative right to a trial free of appeals to passion and
prejudice.
We take great care to excuse prospective jurors who may be
subject to emotional appeals. We take great care to Instruct
jurors not to discuss the case with outsiders or to read about
it, so that they will remain beyond the reach of influence
outside the courtroom. It is a minimum propriety to guard
against calculated attempts to prejudice the jury inside the
courtroom, for they do violence to the substantial rights of a
litigant. Still worse, they would in the long run so debase the
judicial process that no one could enter a courtroom confident
of a fair trial.
/

7See note 1, supra, First, Second, Third, )1'ifth, Ninth, and Tenth.
The line of argument that defendant refused to give plaintiff a job is
contradicted by the fact that plaintiff did not attempt to return to work
but applied for a pension instead. We may assume, without deciding, that
evidence of the pellsion was inadmissible. (Eichel v. New York Central
ll. Co. (1963) 375 U.S. 253 [11 L.Ed.2d 307, 84 S.Ot. 316].)

